Finally, as negotiated, the SALT-II Treaty limited the number of strategic launchers (i.e. missiles that could be equipped with several independent re-entry vehicles [MIRV]) return vehicles, with the aim of repeling the moment when land-based ICBM systems on both sides would become vulnerable to attacks by these missiles. The number of MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, heavy (i.e. long-range) bombers and the total number of strategic launchers were limited. The treaty set a total limit of about 2,400 of all these weapons systems for each side. The SALT II Treaty was signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979 by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev and submitted shortly thereafter for ratification by the US Senate. But renewed tension between the superpowers prompted Carter to withdraw the Senate treaty in January 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, the United States and the Soviet Union voluntarily complied with the weapons limits agreed in SALT II in subsequent years. Meanwhile, the new negotiations that began in 1982 in Geneva between the two superpowers have been called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Both agreements were accompanied by a series of “consensual declarations” agreed and paraphrased by the heads of delegations.
When both agreements were submitted to the U.S. Congress, they were also accompanied by joint agreements and unilateral declarations made during the negotiations. These should clarify specific provisions of the agreements or parts of the negotiating protocol. Official text: media.nti.org/documents/salt_1.pdf For some time, for external and internal reasons, the pages have not been able to engage in substantive discussions on this subject. Finally, on 20 January 1969, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to discuss strategic restrictions on armaments. On November 17, 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms Conference (SALT I) on the limitation of defense systems from the M and strategic nuclear offensive systems. The first real exploration of potential packages began in the spring of 1970. At one point, the parties got into a deadlock because they were divided on the types of strategic weapons to be included in the treaty.
The USSR insisted that basic forward us systems (FBS) were counted in the strategic equation, while the United States believed that FBS and Soviet short-haul, medium- and medium-haul Soviet strategic systems should be dealt with in another forum. The second impasse was caused by differences of opinion on the scope of the future treaty: the Soviet Union proposed to limit negotiations to only discussions on ABM systems, while the United States insisted on the need to make at least one start to limit offensive systems. On 20 May 1971, the impasse was broken when the United States and the USSR announced that they had reached an interim agreement on a partial limitation of certain strategic offensive systems and on a treaty limiting ABM systems. Nixon was proud to have reached an agreement through his diplomatic capabilities that his predecessors failed to reach.